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Abstract
Traffic stops are one of the most frequent forms of interaction between law enforcement
officers and civilians. The traffic stop has been referred to as a “routine traffic stop” when
it is not a known felonious traffic stop; however, routine would imply that there is a
predictable, unchanging, and safe standard that could be systematically applied to every
stop. Traffic stops may present many unforeseen dangers, highlighting the importance of
thorough training. Ninety-four officer volunteers completed a traffic stop training
simulation included in this archival study. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the
initial response, as well as the behavioral patterns exhibited by an officer when a gun is
drawn on him or her in a traffic stop situation. Results indicate that officers tend to
respond to an unanticipated weapon stimulus with hesitation. The behavioral patterns
exhibited, even if the response was immediate, tend to thwart the officer’s ability to
obtain a successful outcome. Further behavioral pattern details are explored in addition to
the successful outcome repertoire.
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The Initial Response and Behavioral Patterns Exhibited by an Officer to a Weapon being
drawn in a Traffic Stop Simulation
Traffic stops are one of the most frequent forms of interaction between law
enforcement officers and civilians (Lewinski, Dysterheft, Seefeldt, & Pettitt, 2013;
Pinizzotto, Davis, & Miller, 2008). The traffic stop has been referred to as a “routine
traffic stop” when it is not a known felonious traffic stop; however, routine would imply
that there is a predictable, unchanging, and safe standard that could be systematically
applied to every stop (J.J. Geiger, personal communication, 03/2013; J. Neumann,
personal communication, 09/27/2013; Remsberg & Anderson, 1995). In many situations,
the traffic stop appears to be a relatively minor traffic violation (e.g., speeding) and
progressively unfolds into a potentially life-threatening situation without warning
(Edwards, 1995; J.J. Geiger, personal communication, 03/2013; Lewinski et al., 2013;
Pinizzotto et al., 2008). Traffic stops present the danger of road hazards (e.g., traffic),
environmental hazards and potential for the civilian to exhibit behaviors that were not
within the officer’s traffic stop schema (Bristow, 1963; Pinizzotto et al., 2008; Reeder,
1981). In addition, lack of effective training on decision-making under pressure could
increase the likelihood of officer injuries and death (Broome, 2011; Thompson, &
McCreary, 2006; Lewinski, 2011; Taverniers, Smeets, Ruysseveldt, Syroit, & Von
Grumbkow, 2011; White, 2006).
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Law Enforcement
Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) published by the Uniform Crime Reports section
of the annual publication, from the year 2000 to 2012 there were a total of 711 felonious
officer deaths. Of the 711 there were 486 (68%) officers killed who were on vehicle
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assignment and 638 (90%) were killed with firearms. There were a total of 127 deaths
and 72,413 assaults that occurred during traffic stop situations. Of the 127 deaths, there
were 49 (39%) officer deaths during felony stops and 78 (61%) officer deaths during
traffic violation stops. The majority of these deaths occurred when the officer and the
perpetrator were within a range of zero to five feet apart from one another. Many of the
officer deaths occurred while the officer was approaching the vehicle, interviewing the
perpetrator, or while sitting in the squad car. In addition, most of the officers were
wearing body armor at the time of their deaths. A large number of officers did not make
an attempt to use their weapon, while several officers did use their weapon or attempted
to use their weapon (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 20002012).
These statistics highlight the importance of thorough training, following
protocols, and staying alert during every traffic stop that is performed (Bristow, 1963;
Broome, 2011; Pinizzotto et al., 2008; Lewinski, 2011; Taverniers et al., 2011;
Thompson & McCreary, 2006). If an officer approaches the traffic stop expecting only
one potential outcome, they may not be physiologically and psychologically prepared to
respond appropriately. This lack of preparation for an unexpected outcome will be
referred to as a “complacent approach”. Experienced officers, in particular, are at an
increased risk for complacency as they may approach expecting a certain outcome based
on past experiences (Lewinski, 2011; Pinizzotto et al., 2008; Tuker-Gail, Selman, Kobolt,
& Hill, 2010).
The close proximity of traffic stop situations may require advanced behavioral
response training, particularly when there is a lethal weapon present (Artwohl, 2003;
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Cappell, 2008; Kaminski & Martin, 2000; Thompson et al., 2006). Appropriate
behavioral responses will vary from situation to situation; however, it is imperative that
officers follow through with the decision that is made (J.J. Geiger, personal
communication, 03/2013; J. Neumann, personal communication, 09/27/2013). It is
important to note that the most common entry wound of the slayed officers were the front
of the head or upper torso based on the LEOKA (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2000-2012). Therefore, additional training in the close proximity
situations should include learning to duck, defensive tactics to obtain control of the
perpetrator’s gun in a close proximity situation, and what situations warrant seeking
cover first (Bristow, 1963; J. Neumann, personal communication, 09/27/2013, T. Beck,
personal communication, 09/28/2013).
Immediate Response
The initial response of an officer to the unanticipated behavior of a perpetrator is
extremely important (J. Neumann, personal communication, 09/27/2013; J.J. Geiger,
03/2013; Kaminski & Martin, 2000; Pinizzotto et al., 2008). The response could improve
or hinder the officer’s chances of survival. Officers will respond to a high stress situation
the way they were trained (Pinizzotto et al., 2008; J. Neumann, personal communication,
09/27/2013; Kaminski & Martin, 2000; Lewinski, 2011). If they were not trained for an
acute high stress situation, their natural response may be an assembly of ineffective
repertoires (Anderson, Litzenberger, & Plecas, 2002; Saunders, Driskell, Hall, & Salas,
1996; Thompson & McCreary, 2006). It may not be possible to train an officer in all
situations in an ‘if this, then that’ manner, however, more can possibly be done in regards
to officer training in these types of situations. One area of concern that can impact
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behavioral responses is a lack of desensitization training (exposure methods that reduce
the physiological response of the officer and increases their ability to respond well in a
high stress situation) and effectively responding under stress (Artwohl, 2003; Broome,
2011; Morrison & Garner, 2011; Oudejans, 2008; Taverniers et al., 2011). Many officers
will, upon seeing the gun, attempt to outdraw the perpetrator and fire their weapon
(Lewinski, 2011). Officers will most likely respond too quickly, reducing their tactile
control and ability to shoot accurately or will hesitate reducing their chances of firing first
(Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2010; White, 2006). In addition, the likelihood of an officer
missing the target in a high stress situation is very likely, particularly if the officer has not
been adequately trained to shoot under similar conditions (Charles & Copay, 2003;
Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2010; Nieuwenhuys, Savelsbergh, & Oudejans, 2011;
Oudejans, 2008; White, 2006). When the target is shooting back or the officer needs to
perform under a high stress situation, firearm performance is significantly less accurate
(Nieuwenhuys et al., 2012).
Marion (1998) described an ideal training situation that encompasses the realistic
shooting situations that may be encountered in the field at a training facility in Texas.
Their training range includes targets that run, that are stationary, and that run towards the
officer. Other departments have purchased electronic moving targets to give a more
realistic feel during firearms training; while some departments have people or machines
shoot back at the officer in training. These scenarios allow for a reality-based training
situation, under stress, and targets marksmanship. Unfortunately, most departments and
facilities cannot afford the costly training equipment that could give a more realistic
training experience. Traditional firearms practice is often a more static experience. The
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skills used to shoot at a stationary target in a controlled setting are not applicable in an
emergency situation in the field (Marion, 1998). The infrequency of this type of situation
should require in-depth training and periodic refreshers to ensure performance when the
situation does arise (White, 2006; Oudejans, 2008).
Traffic Stop Protocol
How an officer conducts the traffic stop, interacts with the perpetrator and handles
a high-risk situation can make the difference between life and death (Edwards, 1995;
Pinizzotto, 2008; Reeder, 1981; Remsberg & Anderson, 1995; Shafer & Mastrofski,
2005). There is not a universal protocol that an officer should follow for a traffic stop (J.J.
Geiger, personal communication, 03/2013; J. Neumann, personal communication,
09/27/2013). In addition, each state may vary in their protocol. According to the
Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training website, the Minnesota
legislature created the Minnesota Peace Officer Standards and Training Board (MPOTB)
in 1967 to regulate law enforcement. In 1968 the MPOTB began certification of training
agencies in an attempt to standardize training protocol. In 1977, the Minnesota Board of
Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) replaced the MPOTB. The POST gained
the ability to license law enforcement officers, which also requires standards for training.
Individual departments may choose to go above and beyond the minimum requirements
set by the POST (Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2014). For
the purpose of this study, the Minnesota State Patrol, as well as various law enforcement
agencies, was the focus for training procedures in Minnesota.
A Vehicle Contacts Instructor of the Minnesota State Patrol shared information
regarding the Minnesota State Patrol traffic stop protocol. The General Order traffic
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protocol covers guidelines for considering the potential for escape, the potential risk for
bystanders, and potential hazards due to other traffic and environmental conditions. There
are clear guidelines for how to conduct the traffic stop from pulling the individual over to
placing the perpetrator into the squad car. However, there is not a standard protocol for
traffic stops in the behaviors that should be exhibited by the officer. Instead the focus is
on allowing the officers to have several options to choose from and knowing the
advantages and disadvantages of each. The options depend on the number of occupants,
aggressiveness, compliance, environment, time of day, availability of backup and
equipment, as well as other external factors that could have an impact (J.J. Geiger,
personal communication, 03/2013). This is done because “there are many different ways
in which the officer can achieve the three main goals of (1) the officer remaining safe, (2)
doing something to meet resistance, and (3) to make quick, effective decisions in all
situations” (J.J. Geiger, personal communication, 03/2013).
An officer of a southern Minnesota city offered information regarding traffic stop
protocol procedures followed by police officers. The traffic stop vehicle approach used
by the officer is their preference, similar to that of the MN troopers. Emphasis is placed
on the advantages of the passenger side approach; however, it depends on the
environment and context of the situation. Using the passenger side approach is
unexpected by the occupant and may increase the likelihood that the officer will see
potential weapons and other threats. A potential downfall of the passenger side approach
is the officer may need to reach into the vehicle, which is never recommended. The
officer should attempt to prevent the need to reach inside the vehicle, as that places them
in a vulnerable position and gives the occupant more control of the situation, even if only
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momentarily. In addition, with the passenger side approach, the officer is to do the “walk
around” approach. This approach requires the officer to walk around the back of their
vehicle and then approach the offender’s vehicle on the passenger side. Most often,
officers prefer to use the driver’s side approach. The weakness of this approach is that
drivers expect this approach and it will expose the officer to oncoming traffic. However,
at nighttime it has been found to be more advantageous for the officer to approach the
offender on the driver’s side because the flashlight will cause a blinding effect on the
occupant, which puts them at a disadvantage (J. Neumann, personal communication,
09/27/2013).
Training on the traffic stop. Minnesota troopers have reality-based training on
traffic stops that are completed every year. For cadets in training, at the end of the
academy two days are set aside for traffic stop scenarios that incorporate all aspects of
the training. The training includes surprise situations of deadly-force encounters as well
as situations that the officers will encounter on a daily basis in the field (J.J. Geiger,
personal communication, 03/2013)
The Minnesota city police training protocol also use scenario-based training
situations that cover a range of possibilities within the traffic stop scenario at in-services.
The focus is on making training as realistic as possible and includes a discussion section
afterwards. Options are given and there is an emphasis on finding cover if needed, while
using the appropriate amount of force for the situation (J. Neumann, personal
communication, 09/27/2013). The traffic stop training includes guidelines such as, do not
touch the perpetrator’s vehicle, try to keep distance between you and the occupant, and
use doorpost to your advantage for cover (J. Neumann, personal communication,
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09/27/2013). Staying behind the doorframe will also require the occupant to look back,
which places them at a disadvantage for attempting to surprise the officer. Another
important practice is not standing directly in front of the occupant’s door. There are two
main reasons for this: One, the door could be whipped open by the occupant either
injuring the officer or pushing them into traffic, and two, bullets easily travel through the
door (J.J. Geiger, personal communication; 09/27/2013; J. Neumann, personal
communication, 09/27/2013). These are not considered to be formal standards for traffic
stops, although, they are considered best practice by many officers (J.J. Geiger, personal
communication; 09/27/2013; J. Neumann, personal communication, 09/27/2013). While
there are no current regulations to follow in regards to the appropriate stance an officer
should use while communicating with the occupant of the vehicle, it would seem to be
most desirable for the officer to stand in a manner that would allow for them to push off
of their front foot if they need to escape. However, most often the officers tend to stand
with relatively equal weight distribution (J. Neumann, personal communication,
09/27/2013).
Literature on traffic stop protocol. It is recommended that officers follow seven
main guidelines: (a) do not rest your weight against the vehicle, (b) be mindful in the now
and be aware of any suspicious movements, (c) always scan the interior vehicle,
including the floor and backseat domain, (d) it is recommended that the officer stand at
an angle to allow for the best view of the interior and exterior of the vehicle, (e) it is
recommend that right handed individuals use their left hand to accept items from the
occupant, (f) never under any circumstance, go in front of the offender’s vehicle, and (g)
always try to remain behind the door post, or body frame of the driver’s window (Reeder,
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1981). As Lieutenant Geiger stated, “The response has to be quick and dynamic with the
end result being that the trooper goes home that night” (J.J. Geiger, personal
communication, 03/2013).
Reality-Based Training of Officers
The ability to perform under high-stress situations is an essential piece of the
officer’s line of duty (Broome, 2011; Helsen & Starkes, 1999; Lewinski, 2011; Saunders,
Driskell, Hall, & Salas, 1996; Taverniers et al., 2011; Thompson & McCreary, 2006). It
is essential that officers maintain composure, think clearly, and respond effectively to a
range of situations (Kaminski & Martin, 2000; Lewinski, 2011; Saunders et al., 1996;
Thompson & McCreary, 2006). An officer can learn to harness the natural response to a
threatening situation and use the heightened arousal to their advantage (Artwohl, 2003;
Saunders et al., 1996; Thompson & McCreary, 2006). When the event arises, the officer
can simply respond the way he/she was trained. For example, in a fire drill you don’t
analyze the probability of the outcome, you simply respond the way you were trained to
by evacuating the premises (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; Thompson &
McCreary, 2006). This is where reality-based training can be very useful for preparing
cadets for the field.
Reality Based Training (RBT) is used to train officers in a realistic setting that
could improve the officer’s tactics in the field (Broome, 2011; Taverniers et al., 2011).
The purpose of RBT is to decrease the natural stress response intensity that is elicited by
high risk and ambiguous situations in addition to preparing the officer to be able to
perform well under similar conditions in the field (Artwohl, 2003; Thompson &
McCreary, 2006). RBT attempts to influence the autonomic nervous system (ANS) to
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decrease the overall intensity of the response (Broome, 2011). As described by Anderson
and colleagues (2002), the ANS responds to high stress and vulnerability by releasing
hormones that are intended to speed up thought processes to allow for quick decision
making in the moment. A perceived danger induces the release of epinephrine,
norepinephrine, and dopamine into the system. The body also releases a number of
glucocorticoids, with the most important being cortisol, which shuts down unnecessary
systems in the body in a moment of high stress and danger. This allows for more blood to
be distributed to the essential body organs (e.g., muscles and lungs) for the in-themoment situation (Anderson et al., 2002). A downfall of the system is that this may cause
inflexible thinking or create a panic induced mental block that generates a hesitation
response (Broome, 2011; Oudejans, 2008; Taverniers et al., 2011). Some are more
vulnerable to the ANS freeze response or may have too high of a level of arousal to make
coherent, logical decisions (Broome, 2011; Saunders et al., 1996).
According to Broome (2011), the goal of the RBT is not to prevent the natural
response to a potential threat of death or injury, but instead to educate and behaviorally
train the officers to respond in a controlled fashion. RBT allows officers to experience the
heightened arousal stress response that is natural for the promotion of survival and trains
officers to recognize the response. RBT then assists officers to harness the heightened
arousal to their advantage in a controlled manner that allows for efficient behaviors to be
exhibited that would promote survival. This includes educational, cognitive, and
behavioral training all incorporated into one collaborative training method (Broome,
2011).
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Broome (2011) investigated the RBT methods specifically examining the
subjective experiences of officers during a reality-based training procedure. Each
participant shared that they had a panic response, or experienced an “emotional shock”
when they first encountered the lethal training situation. This response included changes
in how they perceived the situation, physical sensations, physical motor changes, as well
as what they were focused on. These subjective responses support that the RBT does
elicit a near natural response and allows for training that includes similar conditions to a
lethal situation in the field. This training method would allow for officers to potentially
make automatic decisions in a real-life lethal encounter based on previous training
(Broome, 2011).
To attain valid training, the officer should feel the pressures of the situation
during the training session to allow for the appropriate application of the skills in the field
(Saunders et al., 1996; Thompson et al., 2006). A delicate balance must be achieved in
training to provide a realistic experience under stress. If too high of a stress response is
achieved in training it could evoke hyper-vigilance in future situations that could impede
the officer’s ability to respond appropriately (Broome, 2011; J. Neumann, personal
communication, 09/27/2013). Training should be thorough enough to allow for automatic
decision-making resulting in less stress and confusion in the moment (J. Neumann,
personal communication, 09/27/2013; Klein et al., 1986; Lewinski, 2011). Ensuring that
officers are engaged in active learning is essential to allow for increased understanding
and performance (Taverniers et al., 2011). Taverniers and colleagues (2011) found that
reality-based, high-stress training allows for more active learning for the officer
(Taverniers et al., 2011).
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Artwohl (2003) used the Stress Inoculation Training (SIT) model in a recent study.
SIT follows a similar theory of RBT in that if officers train in a high-arousal, stressful
and ambiguous situation then officers will be able to generalize their performance to
infrequent but potentially lethal situations encountered in the field. This is referred to as
State Dependent Learning (SDL). The principle of SDL asserts that if one learns
something in one state, they will be able to perform it best in a similar state. There is a
significant focus on the ability to recognize the ANS responses and to harness that
arousal to maintain control (Artwohl, 2003). Saunders (1996) explained the SIT training
method occurs in three stages. The first stage is the educational phase, with the focus on
educating officers on what stress is and the potential side effects it may have. The second
phase would encompass training of the skills, as well as practicing. The last phase is the
use of the newly learned information in reality-based situations that are very similar to
the potential field environments they will encounter. This use of behavioral training, in
addition to, the in-course materials is helpful in producing a well-rounded and competent
officer. Previous research has indicated that SIT is successful in reducing overall anxiety
and stress in high-arousal situations (Artwohl, 2013; Saunders, 1996). In addition, the
training is successful in a variety of subjects from low anxiety to high anxiety individuals
(Saunders, 1996).
Previous training practices have focused on the performance basics. These
included facets such as gun use, driving, and defensive tactics (Cappell, 2008). More
recently there has been additional awareness and training on communication, problem
solving, and decision-making (Helsen & Starkes, 1999; J. Neumann, personal
communication, 09/27/2013). Recent training focuses on the ability to recognize and
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control the natural physiological processes that may occur in certain situations. These
training practices, if amalgamated, may be the best option for producing highly trained
officers.
Decision Making
According to Klein and colleagues (1986) officers often have to make decisions in
less than 1-2 seconds in a high-risk situation. The classic model of decision-making
potentially requires a great deal of time because one must understand the situation, think
of the potential response options, identify the pros and cons of each option, and then
select an option to act on (Kobus, Proctor, Holste, 2001). The Recognition Primed
Decision (RPD) model allows for decisions to be made much more quickly. An RPD
model allows officers to recognize a situation rather than to analyze the situation. This
may allow for quick, effective decision-making in a high-risk situation. Officers have
previously stated that if you have to think about what you should do, it is probably too
late (J. Neumann, personal communication, 09/27/2013). If you were to recognize the
situation based on previous training and then act automatically, it could save your life.
This would require situation awareness, which is quickly gathering an adequate amount
of information from the situation to make an RPD (Klein et al., 1986). Officers would
need training to recognize a potentially high-risk and fatal situation. The risk that one
takes with situation awareness is a potential overreliance on past experiences rather than
training. This dependence on past experiences could bias the decision-maker into
choosing an unsuccessful option, and may also minimize the relevant information of the
current situation (Klein et al., 1986). This reiterates the necessity of thorough officer
training to prepare them for the unexpected in the field.
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The decision-making of an officer during a high-stress, threatening situation does
provide a glimpse into the overall training (Helsen & Starkes, 1999; Klein et al., 1986;
Saunders et al., 1996). Training emphasizing how to maintain and regain control in a
situation where control has been lost is an ideal (Helsen & Starkes, 1999; J.J. Geiger,
personal communication, 03/2013; J. Neumann, personal communication, 09/27/2013).
This would include not only the initial training for cadets, but also occurring a few times
a year during in-services for the officers, refreshing and updating the training as more
information becomes available (Helsen & Starkes, 1999; Kaminski et al., 2000).
Military Training
Law enforcement officer training may benefit from additional training
mechanisms that are used in military training. Contrary to military training, when a police
officer encounters a high-stress and potentially lethal situation the response is often to
plant their feet and draw their weapon, which may be an ineffective repertoire (J.
Neumann, personal communication, 09/27/2013). According to Thompson and McCreary
(2006), the military focus on “mental readiness” to prepare the officers for the field.
Mental readiness is the integration of psychological coping and understanding
physiological responses. There is an emphasis on physical, emotional, and cognitive
systems in the training. Military training uses Stress Exposure Training (SET), which
expands upon the previously mentioned SIT to improve the performance of officers in
diverse environments. This not only allows officers to respond quickly and efficiently in
the field, but also improves and strengthens the mental health resilience of officers. In
addition, officers have an increased stress tolerance baseline. This “overlearning” strategy
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used by the military may allow for appropriate responses within the field and removes
what they refer to as “the noise of competing responses” (Thompson & McCreary, 2006).
Military trained personnel are highly trained to respond to high-stress and lethal
situations effectively. According to a Minnesota Deputy Sherriff who was in active duty
in the United States Marine Corps and is now a Use of Force Instructor and a team leader
on the Special Weapons and Tactics team (SWAT), the idea behind the training is to
move. The officers are not to plant their feet and draw their weapon, but to respond to the
threat while moving. They are taught to draw, shoot, and avoid the path of the bullets, all
while moving. There is a need for this philosophy of movement to be incorporated into
how law enforcement officers are trained. In addition, training in close proximity,
combat-like situations would benefit the officers as well. However, most training
facilities and agencies recognize this but avoid it because of the increased likelihood of
physical injury during the training (T. Beck, personal communication, 09/28/2013).
Automatic Response Training
According to Lewinski (2011), training should be done in such a way that allows
for the officers to have an automatic response. Automaticity comes from effective and
thorough training on how to respond in lethal scenarios (Broome, 2011). The lack of
definitive standards for officer responses in immediate danger is due to the fact that not
all situations are alike. In addition, what may be effective in one situation may be lethal
in another. Officers in a situation of life or death need to recognize the situation and rely
on their training to have a quick, appropriate response (Lewinski, 2011).
A Minnesota police officer shared automaticity training that is used with their
department. Their automaticity training includes choices that are addressed for high stress
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situations; for example, when a gun is drawn on the officer by a perpetrator. Ideal
training attempts to obtain a “happy medium” stress level through Skills1, which often
does facilitate a degree of RBT. In training there are weapons drawn, blanks are often
used, and loud noises are involved to ensure the training is facilitating a realistic
experience. This training allows trainees to feel the pressures and know what it may be
like to have a gun drawn on them that elicits high physiological arousal. However, it is
impossible to simulate the reality of that situation in training. The officers often say
things like they “felt it” and that they can imagine the intensity it would take on in a real
situation. Realistic and active training cannot be emphasized enough. You will do as you
are trained, no matter how good or smart you are. “It’s all about training. They replicate
what they do in training, especially in high stress situations” (J. Neumann, personal
communication, 09/27/2013).
Purpose of Current Study
This study was conducted to evaluate the initial response, as well as the
behavioral patterns exhibited, by an officer when a gun is drawn on him or her in a traffic
stop situation. The study may yield useful information about the types of behaviors that
officers commonly engage in and may identify behavioral patterns that promote survival
in potentially lethal traffic stop situations. In addition, the results may lead to staff
development training and improved quality of training for officers, as well as identify
voids in current training practices.

1

Skills is the hands-on “clinical” education portion of the law enforcement cadet training
program
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Method
Participants
There were 94 officer volunteers from two west coast law enforcement agencies
included in the study. Officers ranged in age from 27 to 56 years old, with the mean age
being 39 and the mode being 34. There were 81 (86%) males and 13 (14%) females. The
officers were participating in a training simulation that was being facilitated and
videotaped by the Force Science Institute, as well as their agency. The sample consisted
of various officer rankings; see Figure 1 below for the descriptive statistics of officer
titles. Officers’ experience in law enforcement and traffic stops ranged from one year to
34 years, with a mean of 12 years and a mode of 13 years. The officers completed zero to
80 stops per week, with a mean of 16 stops and a mode of 10 stops (Lewinski et al.,
2013).
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Figure 1. The professional titles of the participants included in the study.
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Officer Training Simulation Videos
The Force Science Institute recorded and provided 94 training simulation video
recordings. The recordings were of training simulation traffic stop situations that were set
up to allow researchers to assess various behavioral, physiological, and verbal aspects of
the officers during the simulation. Each simulation had a series of three scenarios:
Expected Outcome, Verbal Aggression, and Weapon Stimulus. The Expected Outcome
scenario involved the traffic stop to unfold with a compliant civilian. The Verbal
Aggression scenario involved the perpetrator becoming increasingly agitated with the
officer and being verbally resistant to the officer’s requests. The Weapon Stimulus
scenario initially began similar to the Expected Outcome and Verbal Aggression
scenarios, however, it involved the perpetrator drawing a weapon and firing a gun
multiple times in the direction of the officer with intent of hitting the officer (Lewinski et
al., 2013). The overall length of each training simulation (including all three scenarios)
was variable. The length of the Expected Outcome and the Verbal Aggression scenarios
were about 45 seconds each. The length of the Weapon Stimulus scenario varied by the
unique interaction that took place between the acting perpetrator and the officer.
The video recordings took place in a large warehouse; within the warehouse were two
vehicles. One vehicle was a police cruiser and the second vehicle was a 2004 Ford Taurus.
There was an acting perpetrator with Simunition ammunition (a brand of non-lethal
blanks) and training handgun inside the Ford Taurus. In addition, the acting perpetrator
had a “homemade ‘conveyance pass’ and a declaration of his sovereign nation status”
(Lewinski et al., 2013). The acting perpetrator was scripted with various opening

INITIAL RESPONSE AND BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS

19

arguments to use when the officer approached the vehicle such as, “Do you even know
what you are doing?” (Lewinski et al., 2013).
Officers were not primed as to the number of scenarios that each training simulation
would include. Officers were informed that they were participating in a traffic stop
simulation and that the scenarios may or may not be eventful. The officers were provided
a “Simunition, nonlethal training ammunition, and a magazine” (Lewinski et al., 2013).
Each officer wore a “SOLO 915 Men’s wrist heart rate monitor, ear plugs, safety glasses,
identification information, and an orange armband to indicate they had attended the
safety-check portion of the study” (Lewinski et al., 2013).
Training of research assistants
There were three research assistants that coded the videos. The independent observers
were trained by first memorizing the operational definition of the target behaviors and
were familiarized with the data-recording sheet and any questions regarding the timing
system were addressed. After the memorization process was complete, independent
observers were then tested on their ability to recognize the target behaviors. Three videos
taken from liveleak.com and youtube.com were used as a training mechanism. Two of the
videos included a two-minute clip that included the target behavior within the time frame
and one two-minute clip that had a similar situation but the target behavior did not occur.
This was done to show the independent observers examples of what the target behavior
topography does and does not look like. Once the independent observers felt confident
that they fully understood what the target behavior would look like, a comprehension
check was applied. The comprehension check involved the independent observers
watching a three-minute scene from COPS. There were two video clips that had the
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target behavior occur within the frame. The independent observers were to treat this trial
as a real session and to record the data on the data sheet as accurately as possible.
After the training and again after the comprehension check were completed, interobserver reliability was assessed. The study used the block-by-block reliability formula,
which is calculated by dividing the smaller number (sum of agreements) by the larger
number (agreements and disagreements) in each block, and then summing the results,
dividing the sum by the total number of blocks and multiplying by 100. Before the
independent observers were allowed to view the archival training simulation videos and
begin the session of recording the target behavior, the percent agreement had to be at or
above 90%. Inter-observer agreement was assessed for 85 percent of the videos that were
randomly selected. A randomizing calculator was utilized, from the website
mathgoodies.com, to determine random selection of the archival videos. The three
independent observers achieved an inter-observer agreement of 91% for the study; the
range was 64% to 100% and the mode was 100%.
Procedure
Data Collection. Research assistants independently observed the training
simulation videos of the officer and FSI assistant encounters from the FSI. The behaviors
emitted by the officers were recorded on the observation forms provided to each observer
per training procedures.
Data Analysis. Qualitative analysis was conducted for the frequency of behavior
types emitted by officers, as well as heart rate information across the three scenarios. The
analysis of successful and unsuccessful behavioral patterns of the officers was identified.
The operational definition of a successful outcome was (a) the perpetrator aims directly at
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the officer and the officer does not appear to be shot by the perpetrator’s bullet; (b) the
perpetrator does not aim directly at the officer and the officer does not appear to be shot
by the perpetrator’s bullet. The operational definition of an unsuccessful outcome was the
officer appears to be shot by the perpetrator’s bullet.
Hypothesis 1: Officers, who hesitate upon seeing the weapon, will decrease their
likelihood of a successful outcome. Hesitation was defined as a lapse in time two seconds
or longer after the gun stimulus was presented.
Hypothesis 2: Officers who attempt to gain control of the perpetrator’s weapon, however
necessary, will increase their likelihood of a successful outcome.
Hypothesis 3: Officers who exhibit a higher than average (60-100 beats per minute)
heart rate (Tanaka, Monahan, & Seals, 2001), will likely exhibit behavioral patterns, such
as hesitation, that reduce the likelihood of a successful outcome.
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Results
Behavioral Patterns Identified
The officers’ body location during the Weapon Stimulus scenario is provided in
Figure 2. The majority of the officers had the right side of their body angled towards the
perpetrator. Several of the officers had their body parallel to the perpetrator, with only a
few officers having the left side of their body angled towards the perpetrator. The angling
of the body may determine how the officer is able to escape the situation when the gun
stimulus is presented. The FSI orchestrated the footings of the officers for another study;
therefore, the results cannot be independently interpreted here. However, the data is
included for informational purposes to interpret other aspects of the data.
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Figure 2. Officer body location during the Gun Stimulus scenario. The body location was
orchestrated by the FSI for a separate study; therefore the body location cannot be
analyzed independently.
The officers’ weight distribution during the Weapon Stimulus scenario is
presented in Figure 3. A majority of the officers maintained an equal weight distribution
on both legs during the scenario, supporting previous recommendations (J. Neumann,
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personal communication, 09/27/2013). This may have an impact on the officers’ ability to
escape the situation when the gun stimulus is presented. Kinesthetically, evenly
distributed weight may be conducive to an escape. Officers would first need to shift their
weight to another foot and then push off if their body positioning indicated having the
majority of the weight on one leg or the other.
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Figure 3. Weight distribution of the 94 officers during the Weapon Stimulus scenario.
The location of the gun holster for a majority of the officers was located on the
officer’s right side of the waist. This does appear to be the norm with having a majority
of the officers being right handed. See Figure 4 below for the visual distribution of the
gun holster position.
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Figure 4. Location of the gun holster on the officers’ bodies during the Weapon Stimulus
scenario.
An officer’s posture may have an important impact on their ability to escape a
situation. Figure 5 below represents the officers’ posture in the Weapon Stimulus
scenario. Half of the officers maintained an erect posture throughout the Weapon
Stimulus scenario interaction with the perpetrator. There were several officers that were
bent at the shoulders in a hunched fashion and many that were bent at the waist with
straight knees. There were a few officers that were bent at the waist with bent knees.
Officers endorsing a relaxed stance may not be able to respond appropriately to an
unexpected stimulus.
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Figure 5. Officer body posture during the interaction with the perpetrator in the Weapon
Stimulus scenario.
Over half of the officers responded to the gun stimulus with hesitation; this is
problematic. Officers are responding to a training simulation with hesitation, in a safe
environment. This simulation may offer a glimpse into how the officers would respond in
the field to this type of stressor. A majority of the officers that hesitated were shot
multiple times by the perpetrator’s Simunition bullets. Figure 6 below represents the
officers that hesitated and those that responded immediately to the gun stimulus.
Unfortunately, when an immediate response was utilized, it was not always a productive
response. Some officers immediately reached for their weapon and were shot in that
moment. Other officers had other behavioral responses that were ineffective, such as
moving too slowly through their decision, rather than a swift follow-through.
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Figure 6. The officers’ initial response (immediate or hesitation) to a weapon being
drawn by the perpetrator.
Only two percent of the officers attempted to take control of the perpetrator’s
weapon by physically engaging the perpetrator. A majority of the officers attempted to
escape without engaging the perpetrator. While others attempted to deflect the
perpetrator’s weapon by pushing it away or downward and then attempting to escape the
situation. See Figure 7 below.
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Figure 7. Officers’ behavioral responses to the weapon stimulus – escape or fight for
control.
Officer hand positioning during the Weapon Stimulus scenario are represented in
Figure 8. There was much variability with what the officers were doing with their hands
at the time of the gun stimulus presentation. Several officers had their hands hanging
freely, some were gesturing with their hands, and others had their right hand resting on
the butt of their gun. There were several officers that fell into the “other” category due to
the lack of an operational definition for the hand behaviors the officers engaged in. There
were many officers that were engaged in hand behaviors that may have hindered their
response performance to the gun stimulus, such as hooking their thumbs in their belt,
placing their hands on their hips, or placing their hands on the tops of their thighs. If the
officers were handling papers that were handed to them by the perpetrator, they were
categorized as “hands occupied.”
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Figure 8. Officer hand positioning during the Weapon Stimulus scenario.
A majority of the officers attempted to draw their weapon while escaping the
situation, as seen in Figure 9 below. The next most common response was attempting to
fire their weapon while escaping the situation, followed by escaping without attempting
to draw their weapon. There were a few officers that behaved in a way that was not
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operationally defined (i.e., other), and one officer was frozen in place.
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Figure 9. Escape mode utilized during the escape attempt in the Weapon Stimulus
scenario.
A majority of the officers escaped by backpedaling from the perpetrator vehicle
towards their destination, some officers performed this behavior very quickly, while
others did not. Several officers attempted escaping with a right sidestepping escape and
other officers escaped by turning around and escaping with their back turned to the
perpetrator. There were some officers that first ducked away from the weapon stimulus
and then attempted escaping, while one officer used a left sidestepping escape and a few
other officers utilized a behavioral escape that was not operationally defined (i.e., other).
See Figure 10 for a visual representation of the officers’ form of escape.
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Figure 10. Form of escape that was utilized by the officers during the Weapon Stimulus
scenario.
The escape destination of the officers is shown in Figure 11 below. A majority of
the officers escaped to the back of the perpetrator’s vehicle, ending on the rear right side
(passenger side). Several officers escaped parallel to the perpetrator’s vehicle, ending
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parallel to the perpetrator’s car (not seeking shelter). A few escaped to the back of the
perpetrator’s vehicle, ending on the rear left side (driver’s side) of the car. There were
only a few officers that escaped to the back of the perpetrator’s car, ending at the middle
rear of the perpetrator’s car. In this behavioral category, ten percent of the officers
responded in a way that had not been operationally defined and therefore were
categorized as “other”.
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Figure 11. The escape destination that was utilized by the officers during the Weapon
Stimulus scenario
The majority of the officers had an unsuccessful outcome (were shot by the
perpetrator) as shown in Figure 12 below. Seven percent of the officers had a successful
outcome in the Weapon Stimulus scenario.
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Figure 12. The successful (not shot) and unsuccessful (shot) behavioral pattern outcomes
of the officers in the Weapon Stimulus scenario
The outcome of the officers was further broken down into two successful outcome
categories and one unsuccessful category, as shown in Figure 13 below. There were
seven total officers that were categorized as having a successful outcome, four of these
officers avoided being shot when the perpetrator aimed directly at the officers and three
officers avoided being shot when the perpetrator did not directly aim, but did attempt to
fire at the officer.
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Figure 13. The successful behavioral outcome was further categorized, to distinguish the
officers who achieved a successful outcome when the perpetrator aimed their weapon
directly at the officer, from the officers who achieved a successful outcome when the
perpetrator did not aim directly at the officer (perpetrator firing the weapon in both
instances).
The officers’ handedness was recorded below in Figure 14. The majority of the
officers were right handed, with only three percent being left handed, and three percent
were ambidextrous.
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Figure 14. Handedness of the officers included in the current study.
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The approach used by the officers during the Weapon Stimulus scenario is
presented in Figure 15 below. The approach was orchestrated by the FSI for a separate
study; therefore the approach cannot be analyzed independently in this study. The
information presented below is for informational purposes only for analyzing other data
in this study.
100%

Percentage of Officers

90%

82%#

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

18%#

20%
10%
0%
Driver Side

Passenger Side

Approach

Figure 15. The approach used by the officers during the Weapon Stimulus scenario. The
approach was orchestrated by the FSI for a separate study; therefore the approach cannot
be analyzed independently.
There were seven officers with a successful outcome to the Weapon Stimulus; see
Figure 16 below. There were three officers that actively did something to meet the
resistance. Two officers responded by fighting the perpetrator, obtaining control of the
gun. Only one officer hit the gun away and then escaped the situation. Two officers
escaped the situation without engaging the perpetrator. It is interesting to note that
officers that actively met the resistance did not hesitate, while half of the successfully
escaping officers hesitated.
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Figure 16. The behavioral response, as well as the initial response (hesitation or
immediate), of the seven officers who achieved a successful outcome (not shot).
There were 87 officers that had an unsuccessful outcome in the Weapon Stimulus
scenario; see Figure 17 below. There were eight officers that actively met the resistance
of the perpetrator. Of those officers, five responded immediately by hitting the
perpetrator’s gun away and three officers hesitated and then hit the perpetrator’s gun
away. There were 76 officers that attempted to escape the situation without engaging the
perpetrator. Of those officers, 56 hesitated and then attempted to escape and 20 of the
officers responded immediately with an attempted escape.
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Figure 17. The behavioral response, as well as the initial response (hesitation or
immediate), of the 87 unsuccessful officers (shot).
Figure 18 represents the officers that hesitated and then attempted a behavioral
response. There were zero officers that were successful at hitting away the pereptrators’
gun when they hesitated out of the four officers that hesitated. Only two percent of the
officers survived out of the 56 officers who attempted to esccape the situation after
hesitating.
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Figure 18. The behavioral response, as well as the outcome (successful or unsucuessful),
of the officers who hesitated in the study as an initial response to the weapon stimulus.
Figure 19 represents the officers that responded immediately to the gun stimulus
with a behavioral response. There were only two officers that attempted to fight the
perpetrator and gain control of the weapon and they obtained a successful outcome. There
was only one officer of the six that responded by hitting the gun away that obtained a
successful outcome. Of the 21 officers that immediately responded by attempting to
escape, only two officers obtained a successful outcome.
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Figure 19. The behavioral response, as well as the outcome (successful or unsucuessful),
of the officers who immediately responded as an initial response to the weapon stimulus.
A majority of the officers attempted escaping the situation while drawing their
weapon, which appears to be associated to a decrease in successful outcome. Several
officers drew their weapon very quickly and were discharging their weapon during their
escape; however, a majority of the officers exhibiting this behavior had an unsuccessful
outcome. The Other category represented below, as seen in Figure 20, is made up of
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officers who responded by fighting the perpetrator or hitting the gun away. There was

Percentage)of)Of-icers)

one officer who became frozen in place when the gun stimulus was presented.
100%#
90%#
80%#
70%#
60%#
50%#
40%#
30%#
20%#
10%#
0%#

63%#

Successful#
Unsuccessful#

17%#
3%#

1%#

Drawing#Gun# Shooting#Gun#

0%# 1%#
Frozen#

3%#
Other#

Of-icer)behavior)while)escaping)

Figure 20. The behavioral response, as well as the pattern outcome (successful or
unsuccessful), of the 94 officers while they attempted to escape the weapon stimulus.
Heart rate patterns identified
A paired t-test was conducted, in addition to the descriptive analysis used, to
analyze the heart rate mean outcomes for each scenario within the training simulation. A
Bonferroni correction was used to correct for the three t-tests used, resulting in a critical
alpha level of 0.02 (0.05/3 = 0.02). Expected Outcome HR mean (M = 80.60, SD =
13.93) was significantly lower than Verbal Aggression mean (M = 116.23, SD = 19.70),
t(93) = 19.37, p < 0.01. Expected Outcome HR mean (M = 80.60, SD = 13.93) was
significantly lower than the Weapon mean (M = 123.16, SD = 19.91), t(93) = 4.69, p <
0.01. Verbal Aggression mean (M = 116.23, SD = 19.70) was trending towards being
meaningfully lower than the Weapon mean (M = 141.80, SD = 128.58), t(93) = 1.96, p =
0.05. These results are represented in Figure 21 below.
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Figure 21. The mean heart rate of the 94 officers across the training simulation scenarios.
The Weapon Stimulus heart rate information for each officer is presented in
Figure 22 below. The figure compares the Weapon Stimulus heart rate of each officer to
his or her unique age-predicted maximum heart rate. There is much variation between the
unique officers’ heart rates and their age-predicted maximum heart rate. Some officers’
heart rates approach their age-predicted maximum and other officers are rather distant
from their age-predicted maximum. The mean heart rate for the Weapon Stimulus, the
age-predicted maximum, as well as the difference between the Weapon Stimulus heart
rate and the age-predicted maximum heart rate is presented in Figure 23 below.
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Figure 22. Heart rates of the Weapon Stimulus scenario and the Age-Predicted Maximum
heart rate for each of the 94 officers in the study.
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Figure 23. Weapon Stimulus mean heart rate and the Age-Predicted Maximum mean
heart rate of the 94 officers are represented here. The mean difference between the
Weapon Stimulus and the Age-Predicted Maximum is also presented.
The Expected Outcome heart rate of each officer is compared to his or her
Weapon Stimulus heart rates. See Figure 24 below for a visual representation of this
comparison. Officers have a significant increase in heart rate for the Weapon Stimulus
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scenario in comparison to the Expected Outcome heart rate. It is interesting to note that
some officers do have much lower heart rates in the Expected Outcome and subsequently
have a lower heart rate in the Weapon Stimulus scenario. Although, some of the officers
with a rather low heart rate in the Expected Outcome scenario increase substantially in
the Weapon Stimulus scenario, some surpass their peers with higher Expected Outcome
in the Weapon Stimulus scenario. The mean heart rate for the Expected Outcome,
Weapon Stimulus, as well as the difference between the Expected Outcome and Weapon
Stimulus heart rate means is presented in Figure 25 below.

Figure 24. Heart rates of the Expected Outcome and the Weapon Stimulus scenario for
the 94 officers in the study.
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Figure 25. Expected Outcome mean heart rate and the Weapon Stimulus mean heart rate
of the 94 officers are represented here. The mean difference between the Expected
Outcome and the Weapon Stimulus is also presented.
Officer Expected Outcome scenario heart rates are compared to the Verbal
Aggression scenario heart rates in Figure 26 below. There was a substantial difference
between the officers’ Expected Outcome heart rates and the Verbal Aggression scenario
heart rates. While the mean Expected Outcome was significantly different from the
Verbal Aggression mean, you can see some officers have a much larger difference
between the two scenarios than their peers. The mean heart rate for the Expected
Outcome, Verbal Aggression, as well as the difference between the Expected Outcome
and Verbal Aggression heart rate mean is presented in Figure 27 below.
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Figure 26. Heart rates of the Expected Outcome scenario and the Verbal Aggression
scenario for the 94 officers.
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Figure 27. Expected Outcome mean heart rate and the Verbal Aggression mean heart rate
of the 94 officers are represented here. The mean difference between the Expected
Outcome scenario and the Verbal Aggression scenario is also presented.
Heart rate mean for the Weapon Stimulus scenario was analyzed based on a five
year range; this is presented below in Figure 28. The officers with zero to five years of
experience had a mean heart rate of 124, officers with six to 11 years of experience had a
mean heart rate of 118, and officers with 12 to 17 years of experience had a mean heart
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rate of 129. Officers in the 12 to 17 years of experience range represent the highest mean
heart rate in comparison to the other years of experience ranges. Those with 18 to 23
years of experience, as well as those with 24 to 29 years of experience had a mean heart
rate of 112. The lowest heart rate was signified by the officers that endorsed 30 to 35
years of experience with a mean heart rate of 107.
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Figure 28. The 94 officers’ mean heart rate for the years of experience; the years of
experience were categorized based on five-year increments.
Officers with successful outcomes
The officers that achieved the successful outcomes had a mean age of 34 years old,
with a range between 27 and 41 years old; see Figure 29. All of the officers in the
successful outcome category went by the title Officer. The sex of the officers is available
in the Figure 29 as well.

Age of Officer

INITIAL RESPONSE AND BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS
45#
43#
41#
39#
37#
35#
33#
31#
29#
27#
25#

44

41#
40#
36#
34#
31#
29#
27#
F1

F2

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

Successful Officers

Figure 29. The ages of the seven officers who achieved a successful outcome (not shot)
are presented here.
The years of experience in law enforcement for the successful officers was the
same as the years in traffic stops, with the exception of one of the female officers having
six months more experience in law enforcement than in traffic stops. The mean years of
experience for the successful outcome officers was nine years, with a range of one-and-ahalf years to 19.5 years. See Figure 30 below for details.
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Figure 30. The years of experience in traffic stops for the seven officers who achieved a
successful (not shot) outcome are presented here.
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The successful outcome officers mean heart rates are displayed in Figure 31
below for each of the three scenarios. The seven officers mean heart rate for the Expected
Outcome scenario was 76 beats per minute, this increased to a mean of 117 for the Verbal
Aggression scenario, and to 128 for the Weapon Stimulus scenario. The increasing heart
rate does indicate an increase in the stress or excitement, which coincides with the
scenario; however, the mean stays well below even the oldest officer’s age-predicted
maximum heart rate that would be lower than the youngest officer’s (208-0.7 x (age) 41 =
179.30) (Tanaka et al., 2001). This indicates, that the officers maintained control of not
only the situation, but also their physiological arousal.
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Figure 31. Heart rate mean for the seven officers who achieved a successful outcome (not
shot) are presented here. The heart rate mean is presented for each training scenario
within the stimulation.
The unsuccessful outcome officers mean heart rates are displayed in Figure 32
below for each of the three scenarios. The 87 officers mean heart rate for the Expected
Outcome scenario was 81 beats per minute, this increased to a mean of 116 beats per
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minute for the Verbal Aggression scenario, and to 143 beats per minute for the Weapon
Stimulus scenario. The increasing heart rate supports the hypothesis for the need for
desensitization training, particularly when comparing these mean heart rates to the
successful officers.
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Figure 32. Heart rate mean for the 87 officers who were unsuccessful (shot) are presented
here. The heart rate mean is presented for each training scenario within the stimulation.
An officer’s repertoire can make the difference between life and death. Table 1
below provides the successful officers’ behavioral patterns. There are clear patterns that
are emerging, even with a small successful sample. For example, five out of the seven
officers did not hesitate and the officers that actively met the resistance of the perpetrator
did not hesitate. There were two officers that hesitated and one of the two officers was on
the passenger side and was able to escape without being shot due to the angle the
perpetrator had to shoot at. The seven officers displayed even weight distribution on both
legs, offering additional support that this weight distribution allows for the most effective
escape body positioning.
Table 1. Repertoire of the Seven Officers who achieved a Successful Outcome (Not Shot)
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Escape
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Discussion
This study provides support that hands on training should be emphasized with
reality-based desensitization simulations and close-proximity combat defense skills.
Training focusing on the importance of remaining alert with an effective repertoire is
crucial in these time-sensitive situations. This is evident in the behavioral patterns, as
well as the heart rate means, of the successful outcome officers in comparison to the
unsuccessful outcome officers.
The mean heart rates compared across the scenarios offer evidence for the utility
of RBT desensitization procedures to be incorporated into the current training tactics. The
majority of the officers’ heart rates in the Expected Outcome scenario were within
normal limits (i.e., 60-100 beats per minute). The heart rate mean of the Verbal
Aggression scenario was significantly higher than the Expected Outcome mean,
indicating that offers became increasingly stressed within a verbally aggressive situation.
The Weapon Stimulus scenario heart rate mean was also significantly higher than the
Expected Outcome mean, indicating that officers became highly stressed when
confronted with the gun stimulus. This provides support that the reality-based
presentation of the situation does access how the officers may respond in the field, further
evidencing the need for RBT.
The heart rate mean of the successful officers was lower than the heart rate mean
of the unsuccessful officers. The Expected Outcome mean of the successful officers’ was
76 beats per minute, whereas the mean for the unsuccessful officers’ was 81beats per
minute. The Weapon Stimulus heart rate mean for the successful officers was only 128
beats per minute, whereas the unsuccessful officers’ heart rate mean was 143. This

INITIAL RESPONSE AND BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS

49

supports the theory that the officers with the successful outcome were responding to the
gun stimulus with a lower physiological arousal level than the unsuccessful officers.
Officers that are able to maintain lower physiological arousal levels (i.e., lower heart rate)
in stressful circumstances may be able to respond more effectively and with more control.
This idea is represented well by the results comparing the heart rates across the scenarios
of the training simulation. The Weapon Stimulus heart rates overlap with the age
predicted maximum for a majority of the officers. This offers support that officers may
not be able to respond appropriately when tested under that type of circumstance. This
holds true when comparing the officer’s Expected Outcome heart rates to their Verbal
Aggression hearts rates, as well as their Weapon Stimulus heart rates.
The unsuccessful officers were categorized by years of experience in traffic stops
to compare the group mean heart rate across years of experience for the Weapon Stimulus
scenario. Officers with 12 to 17 years of experience had the highest mean heart rate
(mean heart rate of 129). Officers with zero to five years of experience had the next
highest heart rate mean of 124. Those with six to 11 years of experience had a mean heart
rate of 118; this was followed by the 18 to 23 years of experience group and the 24 to 29
years of experience group, both having a heart rate mean of 112. The lowest heart rate
mean was the officers that had the most years of experience in traffic stops with a mean
heart rate of 107. These results support that officers with the most experience may have
the least hyper-vigilant response and the novice officers may have the highest
physiological arousal. This is certainly not true of every unique officer in the study;
however, when considering the heart rate mean of the years of experience, it offers
support. This would indicate that novice officers are not receiving the RBT that would
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prepare them for high stress, unanticipated situations in the field, leaving officers to rely
on their past experiences rather than their training. Complacency over time is supported
by the officers in the 12 to 17 years of experience group, as they represent the highest
heart rate mean, in addition to representing the mean and the mode of the current sample.
If training included additional RBT to prepare officers for the high stress, unanticipated
situations that may be encountered in the field the novice officers may have a lower heart
rate and the most seasoned officers may have the highest if considered under the
complacent theory. However, an ideal goal would be to reduce baseline physiological
responses for novice officers that would be maintained over time with in-services and
further decrease with acquired years of experience.
Of the seven officers that achieved a successful outcome, 70 percent exhibited an
immediate and controlled behavioral pattern to the gun stimulus. Of the “immediate
responders” two fought the perpetrator, while one deflected the perpetrator weapon and
grabbed the perpetrator’s gun, and two officers made a quick escape. The remaining 20
percent hesitated and then exhibited a controlled escape. This suggests that it is best to
immediately respond to the stimulus, in addition to having a controlled response - not
simply a reaction.
There were four officers (of the seven successful officers) that maintained an erect
posture throughout the scenario, two officers were bent at the waist but in a “ready to
move” fashion rather than a relaxed stance, and the last officer had a “mostly” erect
posture, but was slightly bent at the shoulders to see into the vehicle. Four of the seven
officers were using the driver’s side approach and the remaining three officers used the
passenger side (approach was orchestrated by FSI and was not a reflection of officer
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preference). Overall it appeared that the driver’s side approach was beneficial for the
verbal interaction that took place during the simulation, however the passenger’s side
approach was beneficial when there was a weapon stimulus. This is an issue considering
that one is not aware of how the situation will unfold in a majority of the traffic stops
conducted. While Minnesota recommends the use of the passenger side approach, it is at
the discretion of the officer. Therefore, the officer should seriously consider the pros
and cons of each approach. If traffic and environmental contexts do not present an
additional threat, the passenger side approach may be the best option in most situations.
The officers that either fought or deflected to gain control of the perpetrator
shared two common features: intent and control. These two features were expressed by
the lack of uncertainty during the act and evident determination. The four officers that
chose to escape the situation without engaging the perpetrator did so by a “running
backpedal” maneuver. Three of these officers escaped parallel to the perpetrator’s car,
while quickly drawing and attempting to discharge their weapon, while one officer
escaped to the rear right side of the perpetrator’s car for shelter. It is interesting that the
previous three officers did not seek shelter, but they did have intent and control of
shooting at the target, which may have played a part in their escape destination choice.
Another important piece of the successful officers’ repertoire was that three out of the
four officers, that were either drawing or shooting their weapon during the escape, were
on the passenger side of the perpetrator car. This may have allowed them more time and
room to exhibit the weapon-drawing behavior without being shot by the perpetrator.
Therefore, the drawing while escaping behavioral pattern may not be conducive to a
successful outcome when using the driver’s side approach.
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The seven officers that obtained a successful outcome offer a starting point to
identifying a potentially successful repertoire. It is true that every situation is unique,
however, behavioral patterns such as maintaining an equally balanced weight distribution
on both legs and avoiding locking the knees, could be something that would be
generalizable to most situations. In addition, offering additional training procedures on
how to obtain control in a close-proximity situation when there is a lethal weapon present
is another training procedure that would be generalizable to most situations.
Over half (64%) of the officers in this study responded to the weapon stimulus
with hesitation. Of the 36% officers that responded immediately, only five achieved a
successful outcome. This may be due to officers responding too fast, with an impulsive
reaction. This uncontrolled and unpracticed response may have the same effects as the
hesitation response. For example, of the 87 unsuccessful officers, there were 12 officers
that attempted deflecting the perpetrator’s weapon away before attempting to escape. Of
the 12 officers, five officers immediately responded by attempting to deflect the
perpetrator’s gun away with one officer achieving a successful outcome. This may be due
to how the officer deflected the perpetrator weapon. The officer deflected the weapon
with intent of obtaining control and also shot the perpetrator with his own weapon. In
addition, the officer did not simply deflect the weapon to escape; he deflected the weapon
to obtain control of the perpetrator. The 11 other officers attempted deflecting the weapon
to escape and it was done impulsively, without clear intent of obtaining control. The
deflection appeared to be more of a “swatting maneuver”.
Based on the results it does appear that hesitation is a large factor that impedes an
officer’s ability to achieve a successful outcome. In addition, moving too slowly can
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create a similar sequence of events to the hesitation response. This highlights the
importance of thorough training, increased use of desensitization or reality-based training
methods, as well as an increase in the frequency of these training periods (e.g., more
frequent in-services). Training establishing the importance of avoiding hesitation is a key
factor because the hesitation is what would put them at the greatest risk.
The officers of the unsuccessful outcome shared common behavioral patterns as
well. A majority of the officers hesitated and then attempted to escape (60%) without
engaging the perpetrator. While some hesitated and then attempted to impulsively deflect
the weapon (4%). A majority of the officers attempted a backpedaling escape mode
(59%); the lack of their success may be related to the hesitation endorsed. The next most
frequent escape pattern among these officers was the right-side stepping escape pattern
(15%), followed by the officer turning and running away with their back to the
perpetrator (12%). There were some officers who first ducked and then attempted
running away (11%) and one officer attempted a left-side stepping escape pattern. In
regards to the escape destination, a majority of these officers escaped parallel to the
perpetrator’s car (20 officers).
It is interesting to point out that there were 20 unsuccessful officers that attempted
the parallel escape route that was used by the seven successful outcome officers.
However, an important distinction needs to be made: all seven successful officers were
utilizing the passenger side approach when they used the parallel escape route. Of the 20
unsuccessful officers that used the parallel route, five were also on the passenger’s side,
however, all five hesitated; the remaining 15 officers were on the driver’s side. In
addition, 39 of these officers escaped to the right rear of the perpetrator’s car, 18 escaped
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to the left rear, four escaped to the middle rear of the perpetrator’s car, and five officers
escaped somewhere else defined as “other”. These findings do offer support for the
utilization of the passenger side approach, as well as actively engaging the perpetrator to
obtain control of their weapon. In addition, the seven officers that were successful may
have achieved the outcome due to the intent and control they exhibited rather than the
specific escape pattern the officers used.
There were 59 unsuccessful officers that attempted drawing their weapon
simultaneous with escaping, 16 officers were able to extract their weapon and attempted
discharging while escaping, seven officers simply attempted escaping without drawing
their weapon, and one officer was frozen in place. The results indicate that 63 percent of
the officers that attempted to draw their weapon during escape ended with an
unsuccessful outcome, with only three percent of the officers being successful when they
attempted drawing their weapon while escaping. For the officers who attempted
discharging their weapon while attempting an escape only one percent of the officers
achieved a successful outcome and 17 percent of the officers were unsuccessful. These
results suggest that attempting to outdraw the perpetrator while attempting to escape will
likely lead to an unsuccessful outcome. These results regarding the officers’ attempts to
outdraw the perpetrator supports previous findings (Lewinski, 2011), and supports
findings that firing while under pressure without appropriate training is less accurate
(Nieuwenhuys et al., 2012).
The results of this study support the findings that using appropriate force for the
situation is a necessary quality. In addition, quick decision-making in the field of law
enforcement could mean the difference between life and death. Learning skills in a
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similar environmental context that the skill will need to be replicated in may improve the
officer’s ability to execute the skills in the field. The current findings, while only
qualitative, offer further support for Broome’s 2011 findings that RBT does induce a
panic response in officers during a training simulation. The findings indicating that
hesitation is a common response that officers are making due to lack of exposure and
increasing the RBT could potentially allow officers to recognize the threatening stimulus
and respond the way they were trained (Klein et al., 1986; Kobus et al., 2001)
This study points out that training officers how to regain control once control has
been lost is equally as important as training officers how to maintain control. Three of the
seven officers within the successful outcome offered a good example of using appropriate
force and regaining control once it has been lost. In order for the officers to have the
confidence to use appropriate force they must first acquire mental readiness through
training efforts. Mental readiness would allow the officers to make quick decisions,
improve their resilience baseline, and be prepared to move (T. Beck, personal
communication, 09/28/2013). In a high stress, potentially lethal situation, an officer’s
survival ultimately depends on the quality and thoroughness of their training.
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